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 NOTE 
Never Settle for Second Best?  Cy Pres 
Distributions in Securities Class Action 
Settlements 
Oetting v. Jacobson (In re BankAmerica Corp. Securities Litigation), 775 F.3d 
1060 (8th Cir. 2015), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Mar. 18, 2015) 
Brianna S. Hills* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There is an old adage that one should “never settle for second best.”  
While this advice is arguably well taken in most areas of life, it is less useful 
in settlement discussions.  In 2015, more federal securities class actions were 
filed than during the height of the financial crisis in 2008, with more of those 
cases settling than in any year since 2011.1  Consumer class action funds of-
ten go largely unclaimed, leaving settlement funds intended to compensate 
injured plaintiffs unused and undistributed. 
Courts have attempted to remedy this issue by using cy pres, the practice 
of distributing unclaimed settlement funds to a “next best” plaintiff, often a 
charitable organization.2  While the practice has theoretical advantages, in 
practice, it can leave class counsel and a tenuously related charity with a 
windfall of funds and the actual victims with nothing.  The Eighth Circuit 
spoke on the issue in In re BankAmerica Corp. Securities Litigation.3  In that 
case, the Eighth Circuit fashioned the cy pres reward in a way that would 
avoid its two major pitfalls: poor selection of a next best plaintiff and lack of 
compensation for the actual victims.  There are, however, additional steps 
that courts can and should take to perfect cy pres distributions, including re-
quiring the selection of a recipient for residual class funds at the settlement 
 
* B.A., University of Missouri, 2015; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2018; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2016–2017.  I would like to 
extend a special thank you to Professor Rigel Oliveri and the entire Missouri Law 
Review staff for their support and guidance in writing this Note. 
 1. Svetlana Starykh & Stefan Boettrich, Recent Trends in Securities Class Ac-
tion Litigation: 2015 Full-Year Review, NERA ECON. CONSULTING 1 (Jan. 25, 2016), 
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2016/2015_Securities_Trends_R
eport_NERA.pdf. 
 2. WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 12:32 (5th ed. 
2016) [hereinafter NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (5th ed.)]. 
 3. Oetting v. Jacobson (In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig.), 775 F.3d 1060, 
1062 (8th Cir. 2015), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Mar. 18, 2015). 
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agreement stage, monitoring notice to class members, and facilitating the 
input of class members when choosing an appropriate recipient. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
In 1998, NationsBank merged with BankAmerica Corporation to form 
Bank of America Corporation.4  As a result of the merger, shareholders filed 
numerous class action lawsuits, claiming the new bank violated various fed-
eral and state securities regulations, including securities fraud provisions.5  
The cases were consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 
of Missouri after they were transferred from the Judicial Panel on Multidis-
trict Litigation in February of 1999.6  The district court certified four classes 
– two comprised of NationsBank shareholders and two of BankAmerica 
shareholders – and eventually approved a $490 million global settlement 
against the objections of David Oetting, the NationsBank class representa-
tive.7  Oetting argued that the $332.2 million awarded to the two Na-
tionsBank classes was inadequate given the strength of their claims compared 
to the two BankAmerica classes.8 
The first distribution from the NationsBank settlement fund was made in 
December 2004, after which approximately $6.9 million remained.9  The 
court suggested at least part of the reason for the remaining funds was checks 
that were returned for wrong addresses and checks that were never cashed or 
deposited.10  The fund slowly dwindled.11  In April 2009, the district court 
ordered a $4.75 million distribution to additional claimants, leaving 
 
 4. Id.  The merger of the two banks was, at the time, the second-largest corpo-
rate merger in history, with Nations Bank paying “about $62 billion of its stock for 
BankAmerica Corp., creating the largest U.S. bank ranked by assets.”  Mitchell Mar-
tin, Nations Bank Drives $62 Billion Merger: A New BankAmerica: Biggest of U.S. 
Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 1998), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/14/news/nations-bank-drives-62-billion-merger-a-
new-bankamericabiggest-of-us.html. 
 5. In re BankAmerica Corp., 775 F.3d at 1062.  The securities law violations 
centered around BankAmerica’s failure to disclose information in its 1998 SEC Form 
8-K filing and announcement regarding the merger with NationsBank.  In re 
BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 694, 696 (E.D. Mo. 2002).  The first al-
leged misrepresentations and omissions related to the capitalization and risks resulting 
from its strategic alliance with D.E. Shaw & Co., under which BankAmerica wrote 
off loans totaling $1.4 billion.  Id. at 696–97.  Plaintiffs also alleged that BankAmeri-
ca misrepresented its merger with NationsBank “as a ‘merger of equals’ whereas it 
was actually a ‘takeover’ of BankAmerica by NationsBank.”  Id. at 697. 
 6. BankAmerica Corp., 210 F.R.D. at 697. 
 7. In re BankAmerica Corp., 775 F.3d at 1068. 
 8. Id. at 1062 (citing In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 227 F. Supp. 2d 
1103 (E.D. Mo. 2002)). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 1064–65. 
 11. Id. at 1062. 
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$2,440,108.53 in the settlement fund.12  For over three years, the fund re-
mained untouched.13  In September 2012, class counsel for NationsBank 
moved to terminate the case and award class counsel an additional 
$98,114.34 in attorneys’ fees for work performed since the initial December 
2004 distribution.14  Class counsel had already received 18% of the Na-
tionsBank fund, roughly $59 million.15  Class counsel moved for the district 
court to distribute the remainder of the settlement funds cy pres to three St. 
Louis area charities: Legal Services of Eastern Missouri (“LSEM”), the 
Mathews Dickey Boys’ and Girls’ Club of St. Louis, and The Backstoppers.16 
In deciding how to rule on the motion, the district court first discussed 
whether cy pres distribution would be appropriate, opining that cy pres distri-
bution “is permissible ‘in cases in which class members are difficult to identi-
fy or where they change constantly’ or in cases where there are unclaimed 
funds.”17  The court agreed with class counsel that “cy pres distribution of the 
remaining funds is appropriate” because (1) “[a]ll class members submitting 
claims have been satisfied in full,” (2) “identification of members for addi-
tional distribution would be difficult and costly,” (3) “ownership of Bank of 
America shares changes constantly,” and (4) “further distribution . . . would 
not benefit the individuals who actually suffered harm.”18  The court also 
looked to the terms of the settlement agreement, reasoning that “defendant 
acknowledged that any surplus would not be returned to it,” and the court that 
approved the December 2004 distribution “specified that any surplus . . . 
would be distributed to non-profit organizations to be determined by the 
court.”19 
Next, the district court attempted to determine the appropriate recipient 
of the surplus funds, relying on the principle that “the unclaimed funds should 
be distributed for a purpose as near as possible to the legitimate objectives 
underlying the lawsuit, the interests of class members, and the interests of 
those similarly situated.”20  Under this rule, the court must tailor the distribu-
tion to the geographic scope and purpose of the original litigation, which 
“preserves the legal fiction that class members themselves are receiving an 
indirect benefit from the cy pres distribution.”21  The court reasoned that 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 694, 702 (E.D. Mo. 2002). 
 14. In re BankAmerica Corp., 775 F.3d at 1062. 
 15. Id. at 1070. 
 16. Id. at 1068. 
 17. In re Bank of America Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 4:99-MD-1264, 2013 WL 
3212514, at *2 (E.D. Mo. June 24, 2013) (quoting Travel Network, Ltd. v. United 
Airlines, Inc. (In re Airline Ticket Comm’n Antitrust Litig.), 268 F.3d 619, 625 (8th 
Cir. 2001)), vacated and remanded sub nom. In re BankAmerica Corp., 775 F.3d 
1060. 
 18. Id. at *3. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. (quoting In re Airline Ticket Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 268 F.3d at 682). 
 21. Id. 
3
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LSEM22 would be a more appropriate recipient than the other two charities 
suggested by class counsel because legal aid organizations such as LSEM 
specifically help victims of fraud.23 
Oetting objected a second time to both the cy pres distribution and the 
potential recipients suggested by class counsel but was again overruled.24  
The district court granted class counsel’s motion and ordered the funds be 
distributed to LSEM.25 
Oetting then brought this appeal, arguing the district court erred in or-
dering the cy pres distribution.26  Oetting reasoned that the district court 
abused its discretion in ordering the distribution to LSEM because “further 
distribution to the classes [was] feasible” and the choice of LSEM was inap-
propriate because “LSEM is unrelated to the classes or the litigation,” making 
it ineligible to be the “‘next best’ cy pres recipient.”27 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit agreed with Oetting and reversed the dis-
trict court on both grounds, holding first that the cy pres distribution was 
premature because an additional distribution is feasible and second that 
LSEM is not an appropriate “next best” recipient of the surplus funds.28  The 
Eighth Circuit was clear that “[g]iven the substantial history of district courts 
ignoring and resisting circuit court cy pres concerns and rulings in class ac-
tion cases, we conclude it is time to clarify the legal principles that underlay 
our [past cy pres decisions].”29 
 
 22. The Legal Services of Eastern Missouri, Inc., is, according to its website, “an 
independent, non-profit organization that provides high quality civil legal assistance 
and equal access to justice for low-income people and the elderly” and “is a tax ex-
empt 501(c)(3) corporation.”  Who We Are, LEGAL SERVS. E. MO., 
http://lsem.org/about-lsem/child-page-1-overview/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2017). 
 23. Bank of America Corp., 2013 WL 3212514, at *4–5. 
 24. Oetting v. Jacobson (In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig.), 775 F.3d 1060, 
1062 (8th Cir. 2015), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Mar. 18, 2015). 
 25. Id. (citing Bank of America Corp., 2013 WL 3212514, at *5–6). 
 26. Id.  Oetting also raised a second issue on appeal, that the district court erred 
in granting additional attorneys’ fees to class counsel when it was already awarded 
18% of the NationsBank settlement fund.  Id. at 1067–68.  The Eighth Circuit agreed 
with Oetting and held that the award of attorneys’ fees was premature and ordered the 
district court to reexamine the issue after an additional distribution to the class was 
made, pursuant to its opinion.  Id. at 1063. 
 27. Id. at 1062.  Oetting specifically argued in his brief that LSEM was not a 
proper recipient of the funds because “first, there is an impermissible geographic 
discontinuity between the composition of the class (nationwide) and the locus of the 
cy pres recipient (Eastern Missouri); second, there is zero connection between the cy 
pres recipients and the subject matter of the lawsuit or the composition of the class.”  
Opening Brief of David P. Oetting, Class Representative at 6, Oetting v. Jacobson (In 
re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig.), 775 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 2015) (No. 13-2620), 
2013 WL 5162807, at *24. 
 28. In re BankAmerica Corp., 775 F.3d at 1062–63, 1067. 
 29. Id. at 1064. 
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The cy pres doctrine was born as a rule of construction employed by 
courts aiming to save testamentary charitable gifts that would otherwise fail 
by attempting to ascertain and give effect to the original intent of the testa-
tor.30  The term comes from the Norman French expression cy pres comme 
possible, meaning “as near as possible.”31  In the trust context, the practice 
was used as an equitable doctrine that rests on the assumption “that the settlor 
would have preferred a modest alteration in the terms of the trust to having 
the corpus revert to his residuary legatees.”32  In its modern manifestation, 
courts utilize cy pres in the class action context as a way to distribute un-
claimed funds from settlements “guided by the parties’ original purpose.”33  
Unlike in the trust context, however, the “settlor,” or defendant, strongly pre-
fers the funds be reverted to it.  This leads to a strained analogy that courts 
have largely ignored.34 
Many circuits have criticized and severely restricted the use of cy pres 
in the class action context.35  However, most of the circuits to consider the 
practice agree that there are some situations in which cy pres is appropriate.36  
While the Supreme Court has not rendered a decision on the issue directly, 
Chief Justice Roberts noted that cy pres is “a growing feature of class action 
settlements” and, because of the “fundamental concerns surrounding the use 
 
 30. See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United 
States, 136 U.S. 1, 56 (1890) (“[W]here the particular trust cannot be carried into 
effect, either for its uncertainty or its illegality, or for want of proper objects[,] . . . the 
general intention of the testator in favor of charity will be effectuated by the court 
through a cy-près application of the fund.”). 
 31. Travel Network, Ltd. v. United Airlines, Inc. (In re Airline Ticket Comm’n 
Antitrust Litig.), 268 F.3d 619, 625 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Democratic Cent. Comm. 
v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm’n, 84 F.3d 451, 455 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). 
 32. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (5th ed.), supra note 2, § 12:32 (quoting 
Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., Inc., 731 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2013)). 
 33. Powell v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 119 F.3d 703, 706 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 34. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (5th ed.), supra note 2, § 12:32. 
 35. Oetting v. Jacobson (In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig.), 775 F.3d 1060, 
1063 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing cases from the Second, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Cir-
cuits), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Mar. 18, 2015). 
 36. See, e.g., Ira Holtzman, C.P.A. v. Turza, 728 F.3d 682, 689–90 (7th Cir. 
2013); In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 172–73 (3d Cir. 2013); Rohn 
v. TAP Pharm. Co. (In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig.), 677 F.3d 21, 29–33 
(1st Cir. 2012); Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1038–40 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 473–82 (5th Cir. 2011); Plaintiffs 
Class v. Bd. of Comm’rs of the Orleans Parish Levee Dist. (In re Katrina Canal 
Breaches Litig.), 628 F.3d 185, 196 (5th Cir. 2010); Masters v. Wilhelmina Model 
Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 423, 434–36 (2d Cir. 2007); Wilson v. Sw. Airlines, Inc., 880 
F.2d 807, 816 (5th Cir. 1989). 
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of such remedies in class action litigation,” “this Court may need to clarify 
the limits” on their use.37 
As a threshold matter, the Eighth Circuit relied on principles set forth by 
the American Law Institute (“ALI”) in its analysis.38  The provision relied on 
by the Eighth Circuit was ALI § 3.07, which outlines when cy pres relief is 
appropriate.39  Other circuits have also deferred to this section in fashioning 
cy pres relief.40 
Application of the doctrine varies, but typically, the court must first de-
termine cy pres distribution is appropriate, and, once that determination has 
been made, find an appropriate “next best” recipient for the surplus funds.  
The Eighth Circuit, after outlining its framework, addressed each of these 
issues in turn. 
A.  Appropriateness of Cy Pres Distribution 
In its opinion, the Eighth Circuit announced a new take on cy pres dis-
tributions, noting that “[w]e have approved cy pres distribution of unused or 
unclaimed class action settlement funds in two cases.  In both, the distribu-
tions met each of the criteria in ALI § 3.07, even though our decisions ante-
dated the ALI’s work.”41  This section of the ALI starts by noting that “[i]f 
individual class members can be identified through reasonable effort, and the 
distributions are sufficiently large to make individual distributions economi-
cally viable, settlement proceeds should be distributed directly to individual 
 
 37. Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2013) (Roberts, C.J, respecting the denial of 
certiorari) (respecting the denial of certiorari because the issue on appeal “focused on 
the particular features of the specific cy pres settlement at issue” and “review of this 
case might not have afforded the Court an opportunity to address more fundamental 
concerns surrounding the use of such remedies in class action litigation, including 
when, if ever, such relief should be considered; how to assess its fairness as a general 
matter; whether new entities may be established as part of such relief; if not, how 
existing entities should be selected; what the respective roles of the judge and parties 
are in shaping a cy pres remedy; how closely the goals of any enlisted organization 
must correspond to the interests of the class; and so on”). 
 38. See In re BankAmerica Corp., 775 F.3d at 1064. 
 39. See id.; PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2010). 
 40. See, e.g., In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d at 32–34; 
Klier, 658 F.3d at 474–75 n.14–16; In re Pharm. Indus. Avg. Wholesale Price Litig., 
588 F.3d 24, 35 (1st Cir. 2009); Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d at 171–72; 
Marshall v. NFL, 787 F.3d 502, 509 (8th Cir. 2015), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied 
(July 15, 2015). 
 41. In re BankAmerica Corp., 775 F.3d at 1064 (citing Powell v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 
119 F.3d 703, 706–07 (8th Cir. 1997); Travel Network, Ltd. v. United Airlines, Inc. 
(In re Airline Ticket Comm’n Antitrust Litig.), 268 F.3d 619 (8th Cir. 2001); Travel 
Network, Ltd. v. United Airlines, Inc. (In re Airline Ticket Comm’n Antitrust Litig.), 
307 F.3d 679 (8th Cir. 2002)). 
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class members.”42  Thus, the touchstone of the appropriateness analysis is 
whether it is “feasible to make further distributions to class members.”43  
Looking again to the ALI provision, the court held the feasibility “inquiry 
must be based primarily on whether ‘the amounts involved are too small to 
make individual distributions economically viable.’”44  To make this deter-
mination, the court relied heavily on the “administrative cost” of additional 
distributions.45 
Prior decisions of the Eighth Circuit focus more on practical complica-
tions of an individual distribution, including “where class members ‘are diffi-
cult to identify or where they change constantly,’”46 where significant time 
“elapsed since the initial distribution, and many class members have probably 
relocated,” and where “the party entirely responsible for conducting the first 
distribution[] is no longer responsible for locating class members and distrib-
uting the funds.”47  This necessarily includes “balanc[ing] the equitable inter-
ests involved in the case with the need to conserve judicial resources.”48  The 
Supreme Court has further noted that cy pres may be particularly appropriate 
in the context of securities class actions, where a large amount of funds are 
likely to go unclaimed.49 
B.  Determining the “Next Best” Recipient 
The Eighth Circuit again took instruction from the ALI to determine 
which organizations would qualify as an appropriate “next best” recipient.50  
This is sometimes referred to as the “nexus requirement.”51  This requirement 
instructs that where individual distributions are not viable, the court should 
“require the parties to identify a recipient whose interests reasonably approx-
imate those being pursued by the class,” and if after “thorough investigation 
and analysis” there is no such recipient, “a court may approve a recipient that 
does not reasonably approximate the interests being pursued by the class.”52 
 
 42. Id. at 1063–64 (citing PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 
3.07(a)). 
 43. Id. at 1064 (quoting Klier, 658 F.3d at 475). 
 44. Id. at 1065 (quoting PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 
3.07(a)). 
 45. Id. at 1064. 
 46. In re Airline Ticket Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 268 F.3d at 625 (quoting Powell 
v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 119 F.3d 703, 706 (8th Cir. 1997)). 
 47. Powell, 119 F.3d at 706–07. 
 48. Id. at 707. 
 49. See Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., respecting the deni-
al of certiorari).  See also Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 
(1980). 
 50. See In re BankAmerica Corp., 775 F.3d at 1067. 
 51. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (5th ed.), supra note 2, § 12:33. 
 52. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07(c) (AM. LAW 
INST. 2010). 
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In choosing the “next best” recipient, the court should be “guided by the 
parties’ original purpose,” such that “the unclaimed funds [are] distributed 
‘for the indirect prospective benefit of the class.’”53  The Eighth Circuit has 
been clear that the standard is narrow and “the unclaimed funds should be 
distributed for a purpose as near as possible to the legitimate objectives un-
derlying the lawsuit, the interests of class members, and the interests of those 
similarly situated.”54  Courts must also consider “the full geographic scope of 
the case” in determining which charitable organizations would indirectly ben-
efit the class most accurately.55  To find an organization that indirectly bene-
fits the class, courts look for a recipient that “relate[s] directly to the . . . inju-
ry alleged in [the] lawsuit and settled by the parties.”56 
The decisions of other circuits when deciding cy pres cases and applying 
the nexus requirement reveal the general principles used.57  A leading class 
action treatise summarizes those principles: “[f]irst, courts primarily require 
that there be a nexus between the cy pres beneficiaries and the underlying 
claims in the case”; “[s]econd, courts have required that there be a match 
between the geographic breadth of the plaintiff class and the range of the cy 
pres recipients’ work”; “[t]hird, the nexus requirement is generally not abso-
lute. . . . [And generally] the court should ‘require the parties to identify a 
recipient whose interests reasonably approximate those being pursued by the 
class’”; “[f]ourth, some courts look at the integrity of the recipient groups to 
ensure that the class’s money is likely to be used well and not squandered”; 
and “[f]ifth, the cy pres beneficiary should not have a significant prior rela-
tionship with either one of the parties or the judge.”58 
Absent this required nexus, “the distribution would not live up to the cy 
pres name, that is, that the distribution be ‘as near as possible’ to the class’s 
 
 53. Travel Network, Ltd. v. United Airlines, Inc. (In re Airline Ticket Comm’n 
Antitrust Litig.), 268 F.3d 619, 625 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Powell, 119 F.3d at 706). 
 54. Travel Network, Ltd. v. United Airlines, Inc. (In re Airline Ticket Comm’n 
Antitrust Litig.), 307 F.3d 679, 682 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 55. Id. at 683. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See generally Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 866 (9th Cir. 2012); In 
re Airline Ticket Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 307 F.3d at 682; Houck ex rel. United 
States v. Folding Carton Admin. Comm., 881 F.2d 494, 502 (7th Cir. 1989), amended 
on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc (Sept. 15, 1989); Pink Triangle Coal. v. Union 
Bank of Switz. (In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig.), 424 F.3d 158, 166–68 (2d Cir. 
2005); Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2012); In re Baby Prods. 
Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 173 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 58. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (5th ed.), supra note 2, § 12:33 (quoting 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
2010)). 
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interests.”59  Despite this theoretical clarity, courts have had difficulty apply-
ing these principles in any systematic way.60 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
A.  Majority Opinion 
The Eighth Circuit majority analyzed first the appropriateness of using 
cy pres and second the appropriateness of the recipient of the cy pres funds. 
1.  Appropriateness of Cy Pres 
The court first criticized class counsel and the district court for failing to 
rely on ALI § 3.07 for its cy pres analysis, noting “class counsel and the dis-
trict court entirely ignored this now-published ALI authority.”61  Citing Fifth 
Circuit precedent, the Eighth Circuit remarked  
 
cy pres distribution to a third party of unclaimed settlement funds is 
permissible only when it is not feasible to make further distributions to 
class members[,] . . . except where an additional distribution would 
provide a windfall to class members with liquidated-damages claims 
that were 100 percent satisfied by the initial distribution.62   
 
Again citing the ALI, the court added that this analysis “must be based pri-
marily on whether ‘the amounts involved are too small to make individual 
distributions economically viable.’”63 
The majority concluded first that because further distributions to the 
class were feasible, the district court’s granting of cy pres was “an error of 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. See, e.g., Powell v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 119 F.3d 703, 706 (8th Cir. 1997); Den-
nis, 697 F.3d at 866 (holding that cy pres distribution of $5.5 million of food to the 
indigent was inappropriate because the distribution was “divorced from the concerns 
embodied in consumer protection laws”); Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 
1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (reversing cy pres distribution to legal aid foundation, the Boys 
and Girls Club, and the Federal Judicial Center Foundation because those organiza-
tions did not “have anything to do with the objectives of the underlying statutes on 
which Plaintiffs base their claims”); In re Airline Ticket Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 307 
F.3d at 682, 684 (reversing approval for use of cy pres in an antitrust case where dis-
tributions of unclaimed funds were given to the National Association for Public Inter-
est Law).  See also NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (5th ed.), supra note 2, § 12:33 n.3 
(listing cases). 
 61. Oetting v. Jacobson (In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig.), 775 F.3d 1060, 
1064 (8th Cir. 2015), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Mar. 18, 2015). 
 62. Id. at 1064 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 
658 F.3d 468, 475 (5th Cir. 2011)). 
 63. Id. at 1065 (quoting PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 
3.07(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010)). 
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law.”64  The court reasoned that, “from the perspective of administrative cost, 
a further distribution to the class was clearly feasible,” evidenced by the 
Claim Administrator’s estimate that an additional distribution would cost 
$27,000.65  Moreover, “no further search need be made for class members 
whose checks were returned undelivered, so that potentially burdensome ex-
pense need not be incurred.”66  The court rejected the district court’s conclu-
sion that distribution would be “inappropriate because it would primarily 
benefit large institutional investors, who are less worthy than charities such as 
LSEM” and “not inure to the benefit of those actually harmed.”67  The court 
opined that allowing those considerations “endorses judicially impermissible 
misappropriation of monies” and that they are simply irrelevant to the court’s 
analysis.68 
The court then rejected three other contentions raised by class counsel 
and the district court below.69  First, class counsel argued that all class mem-
bers had already “been satisfied in full.”70  The court disagreed, holding that 
“fully compensated,” within the meaning of the rule it announced, should be 
interpreted as compensation for the entire injury suffered, not as the amount 
allocated to each class member in the settlement agreement.71  The settlement 
agreement was clear that “plaintiffs would recover ‘only a percentage of the 
damages that they sought,’” and “the settling parties disagree as to both liabil-
ity and damages.”72  Thus, “the notion that class members were fully com-
pensated by the settlement is speculative, at best.”73 
Next, the court rejected the contention that it is “bound by language in 
the settlement agreement stating that the balance in the settlement fund ‘shall 
be contributed’ to non-profit organizations ‘determined by the court in its sole 
discretion.’”74  The court first recognized the factual inaccuracy, noting that 
“the settlement agreement only permitted distribution of remaining funds to 
charities at the court’s sole discretion,” and it was instead the district court 
that “improperly went further, stating that funds remaining ‘by reason of re-
turned or unpaid checks or otherwise’ would be paid to ‘Authorized Claim-
ants’ in a second distribution, and any remaining funds ‘shall be contributed 
to non-sectarian, not-for-profit, 501(c)(3) organization(s) as determined by 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1064. 
 66. Id. at 1064–65. 
 67. Id. at 1065. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. (quoting In re Bank of America Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 4:99-MD-1264, 
2013 WL 3212514, at *3 (E.D. Mo. June 24, 2013)). 
 71. Id. at 1065–66 (quoting Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 
479 (5th Cir. 2011)). 
 72. Id. at 1066 (quoting In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 694, 
701 (E.D. Mo. 2002)). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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the court in its sole discretion.’”75  The court then held that the vague cy pres 
provision in the settlement agreement had no legal effect because it is contra-
ry to prior decisions.76  But, more importantly, arguing against sole discretion 
by district courts and the settling parties, the court held any cy pres provisions 
in settlement agreements “must meet [our standards governing cy pres 
awards] regardless of whether the award was fashioned by the settling parties 
or the trial court.”77 
Finally, Oetting argued that the award should be reversed because class 
members were not notified that cy pres distribution would be taking place.78  
The court agreed, noting that “unless the amount of funds to be distributed cy 
pres is de minimis,” the best practice would be to “make a cy pres proposal 
publicly available and allow class members to object or suggest [an] alterna-
tive recipient[].”79  However, because the court was vacating the award on 
other grounds, it did not consider the effect of class counsel’s failure to notify 
class members.80 
2.  Determining the “Next Best” Recipient 
After concluding that the application of cy pres was inappropriate, the 
court, perhaps in an attempt to further flesh out the doctrine, opined on the 
second step in the cy pres analysis.  Again relying on language from the ALI, 
the court addressed the question of how to determine the next best recipient if 
cy pres were deemed appropriate.81  The court, again relying on language 
from the ALI,82 overturned the distribution to LSEM because the district 
court did not “carefully weigh all considerations, including the geographic 
scope of the underlying litigation, and make a ‘thorough investigation’ to 
determine whether a recipient can be found that most closely approximates 
the interests of the class.”83  The court opined that while LSEM was “unques-
tionably a worthy charity,” its mission to serve victims of fraud in the St. 
 
 75. Id. at 1066 n.5. 
 76. Id. at 1066 (citing Travel Network, Ltd. v. United Airlines, Inc. (In re Airline 
Ticket Comm’n Antitrust Litig.), 268 F.3d 619 (8th Cir. 2001); Travel Network, Ltd. 
v. United Airlines, Inc. (In re Airline Ticket Comm’n Antitrust Litig.), 307 F.3d 679 
(8th Cir. 2002); Rohn v. TAP Pharm. Prods., Inc. (In re Lupon Mktg. & Sales Prac-
tices Litig.), 677 F.3d 21, 25–26, 31 (1st Cir. 2012)). 
 77. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 
1040 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1066–67. 
 81. Id. at 1067. 
 82. Id. at 1064; see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 
3.07 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (noting that an appropriate recipient is “a recipient whose 
interests reasonably approximate those being pursued by the class”). 
 83. In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 775 F.3d at 1064, 1067 (quoting 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07 cmt. b). 
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Louis area did not approximate the injury suffered by the nationwide class.84  
The court suggested that a non-profit specifically “devoted to preventing and 
aiding the victims of securities fraud, such as the SEC Fair Funds,” would be 
a more appropriate recipient.85 
The Eighth Circuit vacated the cy pres distribution ordered by the East-
ern District of Missouri and remanded the case for further proceedings con-
sistent with the opinion, including another distribution and, if funds remained, 
a more appropriate non-profit recipient.86 
B.  Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Murphy dissented, arguing that the majority’s opinion was a de-
parture from Eighth Circuit precedent and that the record did not warrant post 
hoc use of a new rule.87  She criticized the majority’s reliance on ALI § 3.07, 
arguing that the ALI rules had neither been argued in the district court nor 
adopted by the Eighth Circuit at the time the Eastern District decided the 
case.88  Judge Murphy also distinguished the precedent relied on by the ma-
jority, noting that “[c]ircuit courts which have adopted the American Law 
Institute’s preference for pro rata distributions to class members also recog-
nize that cy pres awards are appropriate in certain cases.”89  The First, Third, 
and Fifth Circuit cases cited by the majority all contain situations in which cy 
pres might be appropriate, including cases where “cy pres distribution of 
surplus funds [was] provided in a settlement agreement.”90 
Next, the dissent discussed the feasibility of making another individual 
distribution.91  Instead of focusing on economic viability, the dissenting opin-
ion emphasized the practical problems with the first two distributions,92 in-
cluding difficulty in identifying other class members fifteen years after the 
violation, counting the number of class members who failed to deposit their 
checks, calculating the interest accumulated on the unclaimed fund, and ac-
counting for the fact that ownership of the shares changes constantly.93  Judge 
Murphy also rejected the majority’s reliance on the Fifth Circuit case and its 
interpretation of “fully compensated” and chose instead to rely on the Eighth 
Circuit’s own language on the issue from Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 
that full compensation means “each class member ha[s] been fully compen-
 
 84. Id. at 1064. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 1067–68. 
 87. Id. at 1068 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1071 (quoting Rohn v. TAP Pharm. Prods., Inc. (In re Lupon Mktg. & 
Sales Practices Litig.), 677 F.3d 21, 25–26, 31 (1st Cir. 2012)). 
 91. Id. at 1072. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1070. 
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sated according to the terms of the [settlement agreement].”94  Under this 
interpretation, the class members in the first two distributions would have 
already been fully compensated thus not necessitating another distribution.95 
Judge Murphy finally questioned the majority’s decision that LSEM was 
not an appropriate next best recipient of the cy pres funds.96  She argued that 
the ALI principles, as well as the Eighth Circuit precedent, support the dis-
trict court’s selection of LSEM “based on the nature of its work” serving vic-
tims of fraud, “as well as its situs in the area where many class members were 
located when their losses occurred.”97  She noted that the parties were given 
time and opportunity to suggest recipients, and because the parties agreed to 
the recipients in the settlement agreement and no objection by Oetting was 
made about LSEM at the time, distribution of the remaining funds “would not 
be unwise or unfair to any party.”98 
V.  COMMENT 
A.  The Source of the Cy Pres Distribution Problem 
In modern consumer class action settlements, the residual recovery for 
each individual plaintiff is often very small.99  The often-miniscule recovery 
is the main reason that class actions are the only feasible route for plaintiffs 
seeking relief from consumer fraud.100  Without the ability to litigate the dis-
pute as a class, the potential recovery would not be high enough to incentiv-
ize plaintiffs or plaintiff-side lawyers to bring the case.101  Settlement agree-
ments in the consumer class action context are most often structured as com-
mon fund systems, under which settlement funds are placed into an account 
and class members, after being notified of their membership, can claim their 
share of the recovery.102 
 
 94. Id. (quoting Powell v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 119 F.3d 703, 705 (8th Cir. 1997)). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1071. 
 98. Id. at 1070–71. 
 99. Martin H. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern 
Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617, 618 (2010). 
 100. Id.  See also MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 131–32 (2009); 
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (5th ed.), supra note 2, § 20:1. 
 101. Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“Where it is 
not economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multi-
plicity of small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any 
effective redress unless they may employ the class-action device.”). 
 102. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (5th ed.), supra note 2, § 13:7 (“In a common 
fund case, a defendant contributes the settlement amount, say $100 million, into a 
settlement fund; the fund is distributed to the class directly or after a claims process.  
If the class does not claim the full $100 million, the unclaimed funds do not necessari-
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The number of class members who actually make claims to the fund is 
often very small, in many cases, well under 1%.103  The median consumer 
class action settlement amount is $9 million, but very large settlements ex-
ceeding $50 million often occur, making the average settlement amount be-
tween 2010 and 2013 a staggering $56.5 million.104  Given the usually low 
percentage of claims and high settlement amounts, the potential for remaining 
funds is dramatic. 
Securities class actions are especially susceptible to low claim amounts.  
This is because “the large number and geographical dispersion of class mem-
bers” and “the impersonal nature of the securities field” make both identify-
ing and notifying class members particularly difficult and expensive.105  De-
termining where to send notice in securities class actions involves a complex 
investigation into the beneficial owner of the stock, which sometimes changes 
several times a day and is further complicated by the sophisticated sharehold-
er list system employed by publicly traded companies.106  This problem is 
 
ly go back (or ‘revert’) to the defendant; they may be distributed pro rata among the 
class members who made claims, or sent to a charity via a cy pres award, or to the 
government via escheat.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 103. See, e.g., Yeagley v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. C 05-034, 2008 WL 171083, at 
*2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2008) (“Out of the original 3.8 million class members, only 
29,168 have submitted timely, qualified claim forms, that is, less than one percent of 
the class chose to participate in the settlement.”), reversed, 365 Fed. App’x 886 (9th 
Cir. 2010); In re Apple iPhone 4 Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 5:10–md–2188, 2012 WL 
3283432, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2012) (“The number of claims represents some-
where between 0.16% and 0.28% of the total class . . . .”); Palamara v. Kings Family 
Rests., No. 07-317, 2008 WL 1818453, at *1–5 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2008) (noting that 
“approximately 165 class members” out of 291,000 made claims); Sylvester v. 
CIGNA Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 34, 49 (D. Me. 2005) (“[O]nly 173 valid opt-out 
forms were received (representing well less tha[n] 1 percent of the total class).”); In 
re Grand Theft Auto Video Game Consumer Litig., 251 F.R.D. 139, 145–57 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (one-fortieth of 1% made claims). 
 104. Stephanie Planich et al., Consumer Class Action Settlements: 2010–2013, 
NERA 1 (July 22, 2014), 
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive2/PUB_Consumer_Class
_Action_Settlements_0614.pdf. 
 105. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (5th ed.), supra note 2, § 22:83. 
 106. Peddle v. Victor Techs., Inc. (In re Victor Techs. Sec. Litig.), 792 F.2d 862, 
863 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Most of the securities in question were bought through brokers.  
In accordance with normal business practices, such securities are held in the name of 
the broker.  The broker, then, is the ‘record owner’ or the ‘street name’; only the bro-
ker’s name appears on [the issuer’s] records.  The actual owner is usually referred to 
as the ‘beneficial owner.’  The beneficial owners have an interest in the lawsuit; the 
object of notification procedures is to notify them.  To provide notice to the absent 
members of the class, the plaintiffs offered to draft and print the notice, mail it to all 
record owners, and provide postage-paid copies of the notice to all record owners to 
enable the record owners to forward the notice to the beneficial owners of the 
stock.”).  The complicated shareholder list system is often confused by courts and 
litigants.  See, e.g., Gold v. Ernst & Ernst (In re Franklin Nat’l Bank Sec. Litig.), 599 
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only exacerbated by the significant time between both the actual securities 
law violation, the initial distribution of class funds, and later attempts to dis-
tribute residual funds.107 
If the distribution problem proves insurmountable, courts are then left 
with the difficult choice of deciding where the remaining funds should go.  If 
the court does not allow cy pres, it essentially has four alternatives: (1) allow 
unclaimed funds to “revert to the defendant, who, presumably the court has 
already determined, has violated the law”;108 (2) allow unclaimed funds to 
revert “to the state, much as most unclaimed property does after a specified 
period of time”;109 (3) “increas[e] the pro-rata share of the class members 
who do file claims until the remainder of the damage fund is consumed”;110 
or, if the court predicts a low claim rate and large residual, (4) “refus[e] to 
authorize the class proceeding in the first place.”111  Finding these alterna-
tives unsatisfactory, courts have often turned to cy pres.112  Facially, cy pres 
seems like an appropriate alternative, but in practice, it can lead to a windfall 
for class counsel and can fail to compensate those actually harmed by poor 
selection of a cy pres recipient. 
B.  Cy Pres Distributions Overcompensate Class Counsel 
Cy pres distributions can compensate class counsel more than the actual 
plaintiffs.  Cy pres complicates the calculation of an appropriate attorneys’ 
 
F.2d 1109, 1111 (2d Cir. 1978) (“There was much confusion in the case and this was 
manifested in various ways, including many changes of position by lawyers represent-
ing the class and by lawyers representing some of the defendants.  There was an aura 
of mystery about the exhibit that was not printed in the Appendix but which, we were 
told, contained the ‘661 street names.’  Much was said about the brokerage houses, 
little or nothing about the banks and miscellaneous nominees.  We were led to sup-
pose that the real difficulty was not the identification of the beneficial owners of the 
stock but rather who were the members of the class to whom plaintiffs must give 
notice the nominees or the beneficial owners . . . .”), modified on reh’g, 574 F.2d 662 
(2d Cir. 1978). 
 107. In BankAmerica, the time between the initial distribution and the motion to 
distribute the residual funds via cy pres was nearly eight years; the time between the 
actual securities violation and cy pres distribution was approximately fourteen years.  
Oetting v. Jacobson (In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig.), 775 F.3d 1060, 1062 (8th 
Cir. 2015), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Mar. 18, 2015). 
 108. Redish et al., supra note 99, at 619. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. (emphasis added); WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS 
ACTIONS § 22:91 (4th ed. 2016) [hereinafter NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (4th ed.)] 
(“If the claims filed fail to exhaust the apportioned settlement fund, the settlement 
agreement may provide that the defendant will recapture the unclaimed portion or that 
the remaining portion shall be distributed pro rata among the class members who filed 
claims.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 111. Redish et al., supra note 99, at 619. 
 112. Id. at 638–40 (discussing the downfalls of these four available alternatives). 
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fee award in the class action context, because a court must decide whether to 
compare the proposed fee to either “the percentage of[] the full amount avail-
able to the class or the smaller amount actually claimed by the class.”113  For 
example, in a $1,000 settlement with ten class members and 10% of the set-
tlement amount claimed, the comparative pool could either be (1) a percent-
age of the full amount available to the class, totaling $10,000, or (2) a per-
centage of the amount actually claimed by the class, totaling $900.  The ques-
tion is then whether funds distributed via cy pres can be used to calculate the 
appropriate attorneys’ fee award.  Courts that have faced this question have 
been split on which calculation to use.114  In BankAmerica Corp., the Eighth 
Circuit affirmed the awarding of fees for work performed by class counsel 
during the cy pres distribution stage, in addition to the 18% of the total Na-
tionsBank fund that class counsel already received.115 
The Supreme Court has expressed support for the percentage-distributed 
method, at least in some circumstances, such as where “each member of a 
certified class has an undisputed and mathematically ascertainable claim to 
part of a lump-sum judgment.”116  There may be “several troubling conse-
quences” to using this method, which does not require a “rational connection 
between the fee award and the amount of the actual distribution to the 
class.”117  Such a method could “decouple class counsel’s financial incentives 
from those of the class, increasing the risk that the actual distribution [could] 
be misallocated between attorney’s fees and the plaintiffs’ recovery,” 
“provid[e] defendants with a powerful means to enticing class counsel to 
settle lawsuits in a manner detrimental to the class,” and “encourage the filing 
of needless lawsuits.”118 
Tying attorneys’ fees to funds actually distributed might encourage class 
counsel “to design settlements that offer benefits that actively appeal to the 
consumers they represent, to come up with more effective notice programs, 
and to adopt mechanisms that lend themselves toward getting benefits to the 
consumer.”119  Courts have commonly applied this method to settlement 
agreements that use a claims-made system whereby defendants agree to pay 
 
 113. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (5th ed.), supra note 2, § 13:7 (footnotes omit-
ted). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Oetting v. Jacobson (In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig.), 775 F.3d 1060, 
1068 (8th Cir. 2015), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Mar. 18, 2015). 
 116. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 479 (1980). 
 117. Int’l Precious Metals Corp. v. Waters, 120 S. Ct. 2237, 2237 (2000) 
(O’Connor, J., respecting the denial of the petition for a writ of certiorari). 
 118. Id. at 2237–38. 
 119. In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 395, 404 (D. Mass. 
2008). 
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settlements on a per claim basis, instead of paying the entire amount upfront 
to a common fund.120 
While using the percentage of the fund actually recovered may have 
benefits for consumers, it might also lead to more unfairness.  As one district 
court warned, “To the extent attorney’s fee awards are determined using the 
percentage of recovery method, the recovery and, therefore, the attorney’s fee 
award is exaggerated by cy pres distributions that do not truly benefit the 
plaintiff class.”121  In other words, if class counsel can show that the remain-
der of the fund was distributed to a charitable organization that at least osten-
sibly benefits the class, a court is more likely to affirm its disproportionate 
request for attorneys’ fees.  Some have argued that if the cy pres method were 
not used to distribute unclaimed funds, “the size of the attorneys’ fee[ ]might 
well be far smaller.  This is especially true when the cy pres relief is estab-
lished by judicial order or class settlement ex ante.”122 
While these arguments may be meritorious in some situations, they only 
apply where the percentage-of-fund method is used to determine appropriate 
fees, a practice that has been consistently rejected by appellate courts.123  
Namely, the two federal circuit courts that see many consumer class actions, 
especially in the securities litigation context – the Second and Ninth Circuits 
– have overturned district courts that use the amount of actual claims made 
against the fund, “rather than on the entire Fund created by the efforts of 
counsel,” as the comparative amount.124  Using the total fund approach taken 
by the Eighth Circuit reduces the issues with attorneys’ fees created by a per-
centage-of-fund approach. 
C.  Cy Pres Leads to Poor Selection of the “Next Best” Plaintiff 
When individual distributions are not feasible, a court applying the cy 
pres doctrine to distributions of the remainder of the fund is left trying to 
ascertain a recipient that would indirectly benefit the members of the class.125  
 
 120. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (5th ed.), supra note 2, § 13:7; see also TJX, 
584 F. Supp. 2d at 410 (stating that in the future the court would award attorneys’ fees 
based on a claims made basis). 
 121. SEC. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 122. Redish et al., supra note 99, at 619. 
 123. Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 423, 436–37 (2d Cir. 
2007); Williams v. MGM–Pathe Comm’ns Co., 129 F.3d 1026, 1027 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(“We conclude that the district court abused its discretion by basing the fee on the 
class members’ claims against the fund rather than on a percentage of the entire fund . 
. . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 124. Masters, 473 F.3d at 436–37; Williams, 129 F.3d at 1027 (“We conclude that 
the district court abused its discretion by basing the fee on the class members’ claims 
against the fund rather than on a percentage of the entire fund . . . .” (footnote omit-
ted)). 
 125. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (5th ed.), supra note 2, § 12:32 (“The class 
action analogy is strained but works by assuming that the court, as when it redirects a 
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Many courts denying the use of cy pres have done so based on the inaccurate 
tailoring of a cy pres recipient.126  Despite the attention paid by circuit courts 
to the issue, when deciding where the money should go, courts are left with-
out “clear guidelines for identification and selection of recipients.”127  This 
process alone is often very expensive for litigants and the court.128 
Some have argued that this inability to ever appropriately approximate 
the interests of the class is a reason for courts to deny class certification in the 
first instance.129  Judge Richard Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, 
warned that the use of cy pres may divorce the purpose of litigation generally, 
to compensate those injured, with a purely punitive goal: to ensure that any-
one but the defendant ultimately receives unclaimed funds.130  By effectively 
allowing the abandonment of the compensatory model, cy pres works to “co-
ercively transfer the defendant’s money not as a form of compensation for 
injuries suffered but as a form of punishment.”131  However, the underlying 
substantive law often warrants no such application.132  If the purpose of class 
action litigation is solely compensatory, courts should deny class certification 
in cases where there is a high likelihood of low claim rates.133  Alternatively, 
 
settlor’s money from one set of beneficiaries to another, is simply redirecting money 
from one set of beneficiaries (absent class members) to an entity whose interests lie 
‘as near as possible’ to that group – namely, a charity working on issues related to the 
group’s underlying causes of action – rather than have the monies revert to the de-
fendant.” (footnote omitted)). 
 126. See, e.g., Powell v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 119 F.3d 703, 706 (8th Cir. 1997); Den-
nis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 866 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that cy pres distribu-
tion of $5.5 million of food to the indigent was inappropriate because the distribution 
was “divorced from the concerns embodied in consumer protection laws”); Nachshin 
v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (reversing cy pres distribution to 
the legal aid foundation, the Boys and Girls Club, and the Federal Judicial Center 
Foundation because those organizations did not “have anything to do with the objec-
tives of the underlying statutes on which Plaintiffs base their claims”); Travel Net-
work Ltd. v. United Air Lines, Inc. (In re Airline Ticket Comm’n Antitrust Litig.), 
307 F.3d 679, 682 (8th Cir. 2002) (reversing approval use of cy pres in an antitrust 
case where distributions of unclaimed funds were given to the National Association 
for Public Interest Law).  See also NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (5th ed.), supra note 
2, § 12:33. 
 127. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (5th ed.), supra note 2, § 12:34. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Redish et al., supra note 99, at 639–40. 
 130. Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., 731 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 131. Redish et al., supra note 99, at 646. 
 132. Id.  Professor Redish argues that this effect is not only unwise, but potential-
ly unconstitutional.  He notes that “[j]udicially authorized charitable donations that 
are neither recognized nor required by controlling substantive law lie well beyond the 
scope of the constitutionally ordained judicial function” because cy pres “contravenes 
the constitutional and political purposes served by the case-or-controversy require-
ment.”  Id. at 642. 
 133. Id. at 639–40 (“There is, of course, a fourth alternative that often seems to go 
unnoticed: simply denying class certification on the grounds that such a proceeding 
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if contemplation and application of cy pres do not occur until later, after ini-
tial distributions have failed to exhaust the fund, courts should apply the doc-
trine and the nexus requirement very narrowly.134 
However, these arguments fail to address the essential function that 
class actions play in litigating federal securities violations.  Courts have long 
recognized the “utility and necessity” of class actions in the enforcement of 
securities violations.135  Denying class certification where finding an appro-
priate recipient of residual funds is not likely would destroy the system of 
private attorneys general necessary to enforce securities violations.136  In oth-
er words, for securities violations, the purpose of the class action mechanism 
is not purely compensatory, as it also serves a quasi-public function in the 
enforcement of federal securities laws.137  In Deposit Guaranty National 
Bank v. Roper, the Supreme Court opined, “[A]ggregation of individual 
claims in the context of a classwide suit is an evolutionary response to the 
existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of government.”138  
For this reason, especially in the securities context, Rule 23(e) is construed 
liberally in favor of class certification.139 
In this case, the Eighth Circuit appropriately applied the cy pres doc-
trine.  It limited the zone of potential alternative plaintiffs and rejected the 
argument that the excess funds should go to a local legal aid organization 
because the litigation concerned a nationwide securities class action, a type of 
case that is rarely, if ever, handled by pro-bono legal aid institutions.140  In-
stead, the court suggested a much more narrowly tailored recipient, an organ-
ization dealing specifically with SEC securities fraud.141  In doing so, it ap-
proximated the interests of the class, the geographic scope, and the purpose of 
the underlying litigation as narrowly as possible, setting a precedent that will 
minimize the nexus requirement issue with cy pres.142  However, while this 
 
would be unmanageable.  Where compensation of individual victims in a manner 
contemplated by the underlying substantive law through use of the class action device 
is infeasible, the inexorable conclusion must be that resort to the class action proce-
dure is improper.”). 
 134. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (5th ed.), supra note 2, § 12:33. 
 135. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (4th ed.), supra note 110, § 22:1. 
 136. Id. (“The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the agency primarily 
entrusted with the administration and enforcement of the federal securities laws, is not 
designed to provide compensation to injured investors for damages they have suf-
fered.  Private enforcement is necessary to afford relief to those investors injured by 
violations of the securities laws.  The SEC and the judiciary have recognized that the 
class action may be the only meaningful and viable method by which securities inves-
tors may remedy their claims.” (footnote omitted)). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). 
 139. Id. at 338–39. 
 140. Oetting v. Jacobson (In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig.), 775 F.3d 1060, 
1064–66 (8th Cir. 2015), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Mar. 18, 2015). 
 141. Id. at 1067. 
 142. Id. 
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decision narrowed the use of cy pres in the Eighth Circuit, more steps can be 
taken to minimize both its causes and its negative effects. 
D.  A More Refined Way Forward: Initial Structuring for Cy Pres Dis-
tributions 
In addition to using the total fund approach to class counsel compensa-
tion and taking a narrowly tailored approach when choosing a cy pres recipi-
ent, courts can take other steps to ensure distributions to class members are 
made as widely and efficiently as possible, oversee the compensation of class 
counsel, and determine, at the outset, the most appropriate “next best” recipi-
ent of the funds. 
First, where a class is especially susceptible to low rates of distribu-
tion,143 courts should require litigants to make provisions for residual class 
funds in the initial settlement agreement by refusing to approve class action 
settlements without such a provision.144  In accordance with Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23(e), “[a] district court ‘can endorse a settlement only if the 
compromise is “fair, adequate, and reasonable.”’”145  In effect, “in approving 
a settlement, the court acts as a fiduciary for absent class members.”146  This 
finding is analyzed using four factors: (1) defendant’s financial condition, (2) 
the complexity and expense of further litigation, (3) the amount of opposition 
to the settlement, and (4) the merits of the plaintiff’s case weighed against the 
terms of the settlement agreement.147  Courts already add additional factors 
and weigh them differently depending on the circumstances of the cases.148  
Adding a factor that considers how the proposed settlement agreement would 
address the distribution of residual funds would allow courts to deal with 
related issues at the outset.149 
In an opinion issued roughly five months after its decision in BankAmer-
ica, the Eighth Circuit spoke again on the issue of cy pres distribution, but in 
 
 143. See supra Part III. 
 144. The district court in BankAmerica approved the settlement agreement at 
issue, which contained no language relating to a possible cy pres distribution; instead, 
the decision to apply cy pres was made after nearly eight years of attempted distribu-
tion to class members.  In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 775 F.3d at 1062 
(“[C]lass counsel for the NationsBank Classes, appellee Green Jacobson, P.C., filed a 
motion to terminate the case with respect to the NationsBank Classes, to award class 
counsel $98,114.34 in attorneys’ fees for work done after the distribution in Decem-
ber 2004, and to distribute cy pres the remainder of the ‘surplus settlement funds’ to 
three St. Louis area charities suggested by class counsel.”). 
 145. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (4th ed.), supra note 110, § 22:92 (quoting 
Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 52 F.3d 478, 482 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
 146. Id. at § 22:92 n.5. 
 147. Marshall v. NFL, 787 F.3d 502, 508 (8th Cir. 2015), reh’g and reh’g en banc 
denied (July 15, 2015). 
 148. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (4th ed.), supra note 110, § 22:92. 
 149. Id. 
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a different context.150  In Marshall v. NFL, a class action was brought on be-
half of former professional football players against the National Football 
League (“NFL”), alleging false endorsement, violation of rights of publicity, 
and unjust enrichment.151  After several years of litigation, the class counsel 
and NFL agreed to a complex settlement agreement under which “Common 
Good Entity, a non-profit organization” would be created and funded by the 
$42 million settlement the NFL would be obligated to pay over eight years.152  
The Common Good Entity would act as a charitable organization “dedicated 
to supporting and promoting the health and welfare of Retired Players and 
other similarly situated individuals.”153  The settlement agreement specified 
the exact and exclusive uses for which the money would be allocated, and 
any funds left from the settlement after ten years would revert back to the 
defendant specifically for charitable uses.154  Unlike the settlement in 
BankAmerica, the settlement agreement in this case contained no provision 
for direct payment to individual class members, and no such distribution was 
ever made.155  The district court approved the settlement agreement as “fair, 
reasonable, and adequate because it provided a ‘direct[] benefit [to] those in 
whose name th[e] lawsuit was purportedly brought.’”156 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed.157  The court was careful to distinguish this 
holding from BankAmerica, noting that “[h]ere, we deal not with the court’s 
authority to distribute unclaimed funds to a third party unrelated to the class 
but the parties’ ability to decide how to best distribute funds recovered in a 
 
 150. Marshall, 787 F.3d at 502. 
 151. Id. at 506. 
 152. Id. at 506–07.  The complicated sixty-page settlement agreement contained 
several terms, including: “The establishment of the Licensing Agency; . . . [p]ayment 
of $100,000 worth of media value to the Licensing Agency each year until 2021; . . . 
[p]ayment of attorneys’ fees and settlement administration expenses; . . . [a] reserve 
for the NFL’s potential fees and costs of litigation involving class members who opt 
out of the settlement; and . . . [t]he class members’ perpetual release of any claims 
and all their publicity rights for the NFL and its related entities to use.”  Id. 
 153. Id. at 507. 
 154. Id.  The settlement agreement outlined the specific and exclusive uses for 
which the Common Good Entity could distribute funds: 
 
(1) medical research; (2) short-term and long-term housing; (3) health and 
dental insurance coverage; (4) medical screening and evaluations; (5) mental 
health programs; (6) wellness programs; (7) career transition programs; (8) 
any medical costs not covered by health insurance; and (9) other uses as ap-
proved by the Board of Directors of the Common Good Entity. 
 
Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Dryer v. NFL, No. 09-2182, 2013 WL 
1408351, at *1 (D. Minn. Apr. 8, 2013)). 
 157. Id. at 521. 
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class action for the benefit of the class.”158  Despite the differences, this case 
demonstrates two important things: first, that courts afford higher deference 
to private parties where the allocation of residual funds is made at the settle-
ment approval stage and second, a potential model for structuring such 
agreements. 
Further, courts can take additional practical steps to enhance the policies 
behind cy pres distributions.  Like other aspects of the settlement agreement, 
courts have discretion in determining if the proposed methods of notifying 
absent class members are sufficient.159  In the securities class action context, 
this should include mailed notice along with publication in the Wall Street 
Journal.160  Additionally, requiring the initial settlement agreement to contain 
a plan for the distribution of residual funds via cy pres, even if it is never 
used, would allow class members to weigh in on possible appropriate charita-
ble organizations before the approval is granted.161  When cy pres is not con-
sidered until much later, class members do not have this ability as a matter of 
procedure.162  In these situations, where cy pres is considered long after the 
initial settlement agreement is approved, requiring class counsel to create an 
opportunity for class members to weigh in on the potential recipient of resid-
ual funds might allow a more appropriate organization to prevail. 
If district courts required class action litigants to determine a residual 
fund recipient and procedures for allocating such funds at the settlement 
agreement approval stage, the costs and inefficiencies created for courts and 
litigators by repeated motion practice and the accompanying oversight could 
be reduced.  Additionally, the costs to the class in the form of class counsel 
claiming fees for work performed on the cy pres distribution itself could be 
eliminated.  Finally, more input could be garnered from class members.  The 
result would be that large, untapped settlement funds could be put to a better 
use more effectively and more quickly.  
 
 158. Id. at 510. 
 159. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (4th ed.), supra note 110, § 22:83. 
 160. Id. § 22:85; Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 70 (2d. Cir. 1982) (“Here 
appellees . . . mailed individual notices, and, in addition, published notice of the class 
action and settlement in the Wall Street Journal.  Some 26,000 proofs of claim have 
been filed as a result of these notice procedures.  The district court, in its July 28, 
1980, order, expressly found this procedure adequate and we see no reason to disturb 
its finding . . . .”); Harris v. Victor Tech. (In re Victor Techs. Sec. Litig.), 792 F.2d 
862, 863 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 161. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (4th ed.), supra note 110, § 22:91 (“Rule 23(e) 
requires that the class members be notified of the terms of the proposed settlement.  
Notice of a proposed settlement under Rule 23(e) must inform class members (1) of 
the nature of the pending litigation, (2) of the settlement’s general terms, (3) that 
complete information is available from the court files, and (4) that any class member 
may appear and be heard at the Fairness Hearing.”). 
 162. Id. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Despite its potential benefits, courts often employ cy pres distribution as 
a means of distributing remaining class action settlement funds to anyone but 
the defendant.  Because of the prevalence of unclaimed funds, courts have 
often relied on cy pres, in spite of its inability to actually compensate the true 
victims in the lawsuit.  The Eighth Circuit, in deciding In re BankAmerica 
Corp. Securities Litigation, defined the practice narrowly by carefully con-
sidering the practice’s two major pitfalls: overcompensation of class counsel 
and poor selection of a next best plaintiff.  However, despite the appropriate 
narrowing of the cy pres doctrine, there are other things courts can do to per-
fect cy pres, such as: denying approval of class action settlements that do not 
contain a clear and specific plan for the distribution of residual fees, imposing 
mandatory notice requirements, and requiring input from class members on 
an appropriate recipient of the residual funds.  Such an approach would min-
imize the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of class action cy pres distributions 
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